This paper provides a theoretical explanation for the heteroscedasticity of asset returns. In line with existing empirical results, our model yields an asymmetric relationship between stock return and volatility. Based on the simple assumptions that investors behave according to Prospect Theory and are subject to mental accounting in a dynamic setting, we analytically derive the unit-root versions of two of the best fitting heteroscedasticity models (EGARCH and TGARCH). The model is supported by our empirical results from two different sides: first, analysis of individual trading data shows that investors indeed become risk-seeking right after losses and more risk-averse subsequent to gains; second, the parameter estimation of our volatility model yields the predicted negative relationship between abnormal returns and subsequent volatility.
Introduction
Time-varying volatility (heteroscedasticity) of asset returns has attracted much research in the recent decades. Since the milestone papers of Engle (1982) and Bollerslev (1986) a great number of scholarly paper has been devoted to the topic. Their findings indicate that the phenomenon can be modeled by GARCH type models. Nevertheless, as the evidence shows below, no robust theoretical foundation has been proposed yet.
Another important aspect of the autoregression puzzle is the asymmetry in the volatility process.
In particular, the phenomenon known as "asymmetric volatility" implies that changes in the price of the underlying asset are negatively correlated with the volatility of the subsequent period.
Despite the wide amount of literature devoted to asymmetric volatility (Black, 1976; Christie, 1982; and Schwert, 1989) , it still misses a robust explanation.
Until now three main explanations for this latter puzzle have been proposed. The first is the leverage effect noted by Black (1976) , Christie (1982) and Schwert (1989) . The authors assume that if the value of an equity drops, the firm becomes more leveraged, therefore, the volatility of equity returns rises according to the increased risk, hence causing the negative relationship between return and subsequent volatility. They conclude, however, that, although volatility is indeed an increasing function of financial leverage, the effect by itself is not sufficient to account for the observed negative correlation.
The second explanation labeled as the volatility feedback hypothesis states that in cases of unexpected increase in volatility (e.g. exogenous shocks), expected volatility rises accordingly, and thus increasing the required return of the given asset in line with equilibrium asset pricing models. This latter has an immediate negative impact on current stock price; therefore, it strengthens or weakens the magnitude of a previous shock subsequent to losses or gains respectively hence causing the asymmetry. Numerous papers on the topic provided evidence in support of both explanations (Pindyck, 1984; or Kim et al., 2004 ), yet recent studies still yield controversial results: on the one hand, Bollerslev et al. (2006) find that the analysis of high-frequency data indicates no significant volatility feedback, while on the other hand, Bekaert and Wu (2000) conclude that the leverage effect is insignificant.
The third main explanation is given by McQueen and Vorkink (2004) -their initial setting is the closest to ours -proposing that volatility autocorrelation is due to investors' inclusion of the fluctuation of prices in their perceived utility (i.e. loss-averse behavior). The authors assume that volatility increases both following gains and losses as in volatility feedback hypothesis. This assumption comes from the paper of Barberis et al. (2001) , which latter provides an asset pricing interpretation of Thaler and Johnson's (1990) experiment of prospect theory in a dynamic setting. The Barberis-Huang-Santos (2001) (henceforth BHS) paper assumes that perception of losses (gains) is more (less) painful (delightful) when they are subsequent to prior losses (gains). In other words, this latter means that previous losses increase and previous gains decrease risk-aversion. However, BHS do not take into account the entire analysis of Thaler and Johnson; the authors do not focus on the finding that investors become risk-seeking following losses and risk-averse subsequent to gains if the opportunity of breaking-even is included in the choice set, which, in fact, almost always applies to asset returns. As we show in Section 2, the individual dataset we use in this paper provides support for the latter hypothesis instead of the assumption of BHS. In other words, the pattern obtained in empirical tests suggest that, in contrast to BHS and McQueen and Vorkink, volatility indeed increases following losses and decreases subsequent to gains in order to allow or prevent breaking-even respectively. In Appendix 1 we provide a detailed discussion on the empirical evidence supporting the aforementioned patterns.
It is also worth mentioning that the original setting in which autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic models were defined was the expected utility theory, that is, the dynamics of volatility (i.e. the standard deviation of asset returns in a given period) have been analyzed mostly in the setting of the mean-variance optimization of standard asset pricing models (e.g. the CAPM). However, contradictory results of this approach to utility perception have been well-documented, which would lead to biased interpretations. Therefore, we build our theoretical model on an alternative approach: the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) .
In our paper we apply this latter approach in a dynamic interpretation along with mental accounting and derive the microfoundations of heteroscedasticity. Our main findings are that (i) previous, unexpected shocks have negative, linear effect on the investors' required return; (ii) this pattern yields a negative effect of previous market shocks on market volatility; (iii) our setting provides the microfoundations of a unit-root, asymmetric, autoregressive volatility process similar to Threshold Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (TGARCH) and Exponential Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedastic (EGARCH) models in discrete and continuous time respectively.
The paper is structured as follows: in section 2 the theoretical setting is derived along with the main empirical findings of behavioral patterns necessary to interpret the theory. Section 3 discusses the behavioral patterns emerging in an individual trading dataset and an empirical parameter estimation of the model through a time-series analysis of asset prices. Finally, section 4 summarizes the main conclusions of the paper and provides potential ways of further research.
The model
As provided in Appendix 1, the previous market return plays a dominant role in the volatility dynamics of assets and is mainly responsible for the asymmetric response to shocks. We argue that this phenomenon can be explained by applying prospect theory in a dynamic setting.
Dynamics of the required return
Assuming that investors hold portfolios similar to the market portfolio, or at least that they diversify and hence invest into multiple assets, their portfolio is highly correlated with the market. In other words, a negative or positive market shock leads to losses and gains on investors' portfolios. Thaler and Johnson (1990) show in their experimental study that in such cases (if breaking even is in the choice set) investors become risk-seeking following losses and more risk-averse subsequent to gains; they aim to avoid realizing losses (exactly as in disposition effect (Shefrin and Statman, 1985 and Odean, 1998) ) and are afraid of losing previous paper gains. This behavior comes from the S-shaped value function of loss-aversion: if we include the previous outcome as a reference point, the convexity of utility perception in the domain of losses results in risk-seeking behavior as the expected utility reaches its maximum at positive risk. In this specific case, considering the previous outcome as a fixed loss would cause greater pain than aggregating in time and hoping to break even; however, realizing the previous gain yields higher expected utility than taking the risk of losing the accumulated wealth.
Therefore, mental accounting (the mental aggregation or separation of pieces of information) in a dynamic setting leads investors to aggregate in time. Hence, they aim to obtain a given reference return at each period or, at least, earn this return on average. That is, if we assume the rational expectations of outcomes as the reference point (Koszegi and Rabin, 2006) , the subsequent required return is decreased by the previous abnormal return to be able to obtain the pre-defined reference return on average. Analytically the aforementioned is described with the following equation
where , , and µ stand for the risk-free rate, the portfolio return and the required portfolio return of a given investor respectively. In particular, if we assume that investors form their expectations rationally and allocate their portfolio accordingly (i.e. they choose from the efficient portfolios), µ represents both the required and the expected return of their portfolio as the latter two become equal. Therefore, r − µ stands for the abnormal portfolio return in the previous period, which modifies the current period required (expected) return through α. The economic interpretation of this latter variable is defined as the sensitivity of an investor to mental accounting (the aggregation of previous outcomes). It would make no sense to assume that market participants adjust the required return by more than the previous shock itself; hence, we set its lower boundary at -1. Its negative value is due to the definition: aggregating in time increases or decreases the required return subsequent to losses or gains respectively. The , − , term is added as the correction for the change in the risk-free rate or inflation. We underline that evidence for the aforementioned patterns in the dynamics of risk-seeking, reference-dependence and framing have been bolstered by numerous studies from alternative field of science as well such as neuroeconomics (Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005) and non-human physiology (Chen et al, 2006; Lakshminarayanan et al., 2011) . These findings provide support for our theoretical setting and increase the relevance and robustness of the results.
It is also worth mentioning here that autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (henceforth ARCH) models (Engle, 1982) were created in the setting of standard asset pricing models that are based on the expected utility theory (EUT); however, the latter would not yield the behavior described above. In contrast to prospect theory, EUT assumes concave utility in all domains of wealth, and therefore, would never induce risk-seeking behavior following losses. Therefore, the aforementioned behavior cannot be analyzed in a standard asset pricing structure; hence in order to give a coherent setting, the following section provides the definition of the risk-return relationship in prospect theory.
The mean-volatility relationship in prospect theory
The application of prospect theory in asset pricing attracted close attention in behavioral finance. Out of these, we discuss the most relevant findings that are related to our model. Levy and Levy (2004) argues that the mean-variance optimization of standard asset pricing models applies to prospect theory as well. In particular, they find that the prospect theory efficient set is a subset of the mean-variance efficient frontier and even by including probability distortion, the two sets almost coincide. Their results are confirmed and extended to asset pricing models in the paper of De Giorgi et al. (2003) and Barberis and Huang (2008) . The latter papers show that if the financial market equilibrium exists then the security market line theorem of CAPM holds under cumulative prospect theory as well. This finding also means that diversifying investors hold portfolios from the capital market line, and therefore, the relationship between volatility and expected return is linear for efficient portfolios.
Adding this linearity to the theory of the inclusion of previous gains and losses (as in Eq. (1)) leads to linearly decreased and increased portfolio volatility subsequent to gains and losses respectively.
The dynamics of portfolio volatility
In the followings, we present an analytical derivation of the dynamics of volatility. We define the intertemporal change of volatility in Eq. (3) and (4). Here we assume that in an equilibrium setting the price of risk does not change over time; nonetheless, the required return is not constant but follows the dynamics of
Here we applied the aforementioned linearity between risk and expected return of the CAPM setting. As long as we assume that investors hold well-diversified portfolios, only systematic risk is priced; therefore, stands for the market-related portfolio risk (henceforth volatility).
represents the slope of capital market line or the price of risk. The economic interpretation of Eq. (3) is that subsequent to losses investors aim to obtain higher expected return; however, according to equilibrium pricing, they can only achieve their goal by investing in riskier assets or increasing leverage. Solving the latter equation for the dynamics of volatility yields
where and ∆ represent an error term and the change in the standard Wiener process in discrete time. Eq. (4) reveals that follows a unit-root process with constant conditional mean, that is
where ℱ stands for the filtration (information available) at time t. Here, the separation of contemporaneous volatility and noise requires the assumption that they are uncorrelated (only the delayed response yields a negative correlation). According to Eq. (5), the volatility process seems to be valid and realistic in the sense that periodical volatility tends to remain in a finite interval over a long horizon; it converges neither to infinity nor to zero. Furthermore, Eq. (4) reveals another interesting pattern: it is very similar to the Threshold Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (henceforth TGARCH) model introduced by Zakoian (1994) that is one of the most accurate heteroscedasticity models based on goodnessof-fit tests (Awartani and Corradi, 2005; Tavares et al., 2008) . In particular, TGARCH models are defined as (1991) . Dividing by and taking the natural logarithms of both sides yields ln = ln + ln 1 + ∆ .
Taking the Taylor approximation around ∆ = 0 then gives
Due to the well-known property of the Wiener process, as Δt approaches to zero (the continuous time version is considered) third and higher order polynomials of ∆ vanish and ∆ = ∆ . Therefore, the continuous time version of Eq. (7) can be written as
or by multiplying both sides by 2
The similarity to EGARCH comes from its definition of
where = − , 2 = , = 0 and = yields exactly Eq. (10). The unit-root, constant conditional mean property of Eq. (10) is again found by applying Itō's lemma for
Then the inverse function is defined as
.
By Itō's lemma
Again, the correlation between concurrent volatility and noise has zero expected value, therefore, the conditional mean is constant regardless of the length of delay. In conclusion, the TGARCH and EGARCH models are implications of prospect theory in a dynamic setting and they represent the underlying volatility process in discrete and continuous time respectively.
The dynamics of market volatility
We have derived so far the change of investors' risk attitude and the dynamics of the volatility of their portfolios. However, reasons behind the change of market volatility have not yet been covered. In this section, we propose an explanation for the positive relationship between the dynamics of market volatility and the riskiness of investors' portfolio based on a simple market microstructural idea.
As discussed above, mental accounting leads to a clear pattern in investors choice that depends on the previous unexpected price shock: losses increase the subsequent demand for risky assets, whereas, gains reduce their demand. If we stick to the idea that, as assumed in Section 2.2, investors hold the market portfolio or at least a well-diversified one that is correlated with the market, one can clearly see the following market microstructural situation: in line with the model of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) we find informed and uninformed traders in the market with probabilities and (1 − ) that place market orders. In their model the informed investors know the exact value of an asset that can be either high ( ) or low ( ) and place their orders accordingly. Other participants of the market, such as the specialists that provide the liquidity by placing limit orders (thus define the spread) know only the probability of the true value that is ( = ) = and ( = ) = 1 − . Uninformed investors place their buy and sell orders completely randomly; hence, the probabilities of buy and sell orders coming from uninformed traders are equal ( = 0.5).
Therefore, the profit of specialists is generated by the losses on transactions with informed investors and gains on transactions with uninformed investors. If we assume that the market is competitive, their zero expected profit criteria for transactions at the buy limit price and at the sell limit price yield the equilibrium ask and bid prices respectively (and the spread as their difference).
Moreover, if we introduce the pattern discussed in the previous sections, the spread changes in the following way: let us assume that, based on mental accounting heuristic, there is a new type of investors in addition to informed and uninformed traders, the heuristic-driven investor. This latter definition is not new in related literature: although, according to the pioneering papers of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Kyle (1985) uninformed traders are defined as those who do not possess fundamental information on assets, irrespective of their motives, a definition similar to our setting has already appeared in the paper of Bloomfield et al. (2009b) , in which uninformed investors can have other trading motives than fundamental (e.g. behavioral). In their study the similar three-class distinction of investors is analyzed, where informed and uninformed investors and liquidity traders are present. The liquidity trader, however, may follow a behavioral pattern according to the dynamics of liquidity demand we have discussed so far; hence, we call this class the heuristic-driven trader.
Turning back to the introduction of such traders in the equilibrium criteria, let and and
(1 − − ) stand for the shares of informed, heuristic-driven and uninformed traders (the probability of their trades). Then, subsequent to a negative market shock, the zero profit criteria of specialists at the ask and bid prices can be defined as
Then the ask price is given as
whereas the bid price follows
One can clearly see the economic processes underlying in the aforementioned formulas: if herustic-driven traders are present the midprice differs from the expected value. Subsequent to a negative shock, the proportion of investors place buy orders at the ask price; however, they do not form supply at the bid price. Furthemore, their uninformed trades contribute positively to the profit; therefore, the equilibrium ask price declines as in Eq. (17). Still, their existence lowers the proportion of uninformed investors; hence, the equilibrium bid price declines as well as in Eq. (18). Although, both the ask and bid prices decline, the zero profit remains intact due to the modified probabilities of incoming buy and sell orders.
Then, the spread in competitive equilibrium can be defined as
where stands for the spread subsequent to a negative market shock. The spread following positive market shocks is similar except for the sign of :
Let the spread be defined as a function of where
. . In other words, if the probability of a subsequent higher value is greater than that of a lower value, then spread is greater subsequent to a negative shock than it is following a positive shock.
The economic intuition behind an average > 0.5 is simple as the growth of value is one of the basic assumptions in analyzing capital markets. This greater probability of a higher value is confirmed by empirical studies as well: although the authors apply a bit different methodology, Easley et al. (2002) and Brennan et al. (2014) measure the probability of an increase in the value to be ( | = ) = 0.67 and 0.614. The aforementioned pattern is represented in Figure   1 , where the spread (defined as in Eq. (21)) is shown as a function of and : the calculation is made for the constraints of , ∈ [0.1,0.9], = 0.1, − = 1. Irrespective of probability of informed trading, (shown in the vertical axis), the difference of spread is clearly positive for probability of higher value (shown in the horizontal axis), > 0.5 and negative for < 0.5 if the probability of heuristic-driven investors is positive.
Figure 1: The formation of spread if heuristic-driven trading is present
Notes: The figure represents the spread values according to the colorbar to the right. The axes, Theta and Pi stand for the probability of high value and the probability of informed traders. The difference between high and low values, − is set to one. The probability of heuristic-driven traders is defined by = 0.1.
In conclusion, we argue that, on average, the spread increases subsequent to losses and decreases subsequent to gains. Moreover, considering that continuous market orders at the ask and bid prices define the standard deviation of price changes, our explanation clearly implies that previous positive (negative) shocks decrease (increase) both the spread and the volatility accordingly. 
Empirical results
In this section we present empirical results supporting our theory in two different ways: first,
investors' dynamic behavior is tested on a large sample containing individual trading data;
second, an empirical parameter estimation of our volatility model is provided using CRSP database consisting of the daily log-returns of the Standard and Poor's 500 index member listed on 10 September, 2014. The analyzed period covers 21 years from 10 September 1993 to 10 September 2014.
Patterns in intertemporal choice
In the followings, we provide empirical support to our theoretical investigation: losses and gains induce risk-seeking and more risk-averse behavior respectively. We argue that this behavior is a response to loss-aversion in a dynamic context, that is, investors are reluctant to realize losses (either physically or mentally) and try to break even in order to obtain their initial benchmark on average. According to equilibrium asset pricing, higher required return that compensates for the previous loss is only reachable by investing in assets with increased risk; therefore, combined with the change in risk attitude, losses increase the volatility of returns in the subsequent period.
Gains follow the opposite pattern: investors fear of losing the previous wealth; hence, they invest into less risky portfolios since the initial benchmark level is still reachable with the latter.
The data and methodology of this analysis are as follows: Our sample is similar to that of Barber and Odean (2000) consisting of the transactions and descriptive data of 158,006 accounts at a large discount brokerage firm from January 1991 to December 1996. In this paper we aim at defining the change in the riskiness (as measured by volatility) of investors' portfolio; therefore, only common stocks investments are considered, since a meaningful amount of historical returns and realized volatility can only be calculated for these latter assets. Nevertheless, findings in this reduced sub-sample should be representative for the whole sample as the former account for 64% of the latter as measured by the number of observations. Altogether, the dataset containing at least one common stock transaction in the period includes 104,225
accounts, which can be further decomposed based on the type of the account, in which we apply cash, IRA and margin accounts as control variables, and the equity held by the related household at the end of the period. In Table 1 the descriptive statistics of these sub-samples are presented. In return calculations we use different types of mental frames. First, we assume that when selling occurs the profit is measured as the selling price relative to the pre-transaction average buy price of an asset. However, as the long position in an asset may include numerous buy transactions before selling the stock, we argue that if the representativity or anchoring heuristics are responsible for the change in the risk attitude, the most recent information (i.e. the price of the last buy transaction) is the main factor in utility perception. Having calculated the gain or loss, the asset into which the realized money flows in the subsequent buy transaction is defined.
Related to both the bought and sold assets the variance and standard deviation of daily returns in the preceding year are calculated. Finally, based on the aforementioned parameters, regressions are estimated to analyze whether the risk of the targeted asset is driven by the previous outcome.
The first regression (first 2 columns in Table 2 ) applies the simple OLS estimation of the variance of the targeted asset including the profit (the return based on the average buy price) of the previous transaction as the independent variable, that is
where , and ̅ , , stand for the variance of the asset in the subsequent buy transaction and the average return of the realized sell transaction of each i trade pair respectively.
In the second regression we test whether the change in the definition of the return increases significance and goodness-of-fit. This estimation is shown in Eq. (26) where the previous profit , is measured as the return on the price of the last transaction.
One may argue that the variance also correlates with the risk of the sold asset as well: an investor may have a preference for risky assets, which could lead to a biased estimation of in the previous equation. Therefore, the third regression (Eq. (27)) includes , as the variance of the sold asset using the return on the last buy price respectively.
According to equilibrium pricing, investors do require a premium for risk; thus, their expected return is different from zero. Including this finding in the fourth regression, a new definition of return may provide a better fit to utility perception: here the perceived return is defined as the deviation from the historical (one year) expected return at the last buy transaction preceding the sell transaction of an asset. In other words, we assume that investors form their non-zero expectations at the time they invest into an asset based on its performance in the past.
Accordingly, as both the length of time between last buy and subsequent sell transactions and the risk of assets varies throughout the data, another adjustment is required: the expected return is not the same for each transaction; hence, we standardize the deviation from the expected return by dividing it by the number of days between the buy and sell transactions.
Subsequent to this definition we use this daily average deviation from the expectation as an independent variable as in the following Eq. (28), where and stand for the time when the sell and the previous buy transactions occurred:
In order to be able to distinguish effects of previous gains from losses we apply two separated variables in regression five as defined in Eq. (29) 
Having analyzed the effects of previous outcomes on risk attitude as measured by variance, we provide further tests that include volatility instead of the former. The importance of this additional analysis is already highlighted in section 2.2, where we discussed that asset prices in prospect theory are driven by standard deviation rather than variance. Hence, in further regressions we apply volatility as the dependent variable. The sixth regression is the same as Eq. (29) except for the previously defined change in the definition of risk.
Our extensive dataset covers further parameters related to each trading account; in particular, the equity held at the end of the period and the type of the account is included as well. In further regressions we also apply these latter measures as control variables and investigate differences between the subgroups. The seventh regression is defined as in Eq. (30) 
In regression eight we modify Eq. (30) according to Eq. (29) , that is, by separately estimating the coefficients of gains and losses. Then, in subsequent estimations we apply this latter frame in subgroup estimations: in the ninth equation the effects for accounts with equity value above its median (i.e. the top 50% of investors ranked by equity value) are estimated, whereas the tenth calculates coefficients for the bottom 50%. In the last three regressions effects for subgroups with a cash, IRA and margin account types are estimated.
In Table 2 we provide the empirical results of the estimations: results for groups of regressions one to three, four to six, seven to ten and eleven to thirteen are shown in Panel A, B, C and D respectively. (25) to (30) and their adjustments. The dependent variables are listed in the columns, the Coef columns represent the estimated coefficients for the parameters listed in the rows, whereas the p-value columns stand for the probability of an incorrect rejection of the zero null hypothesis.
Results of the first four regressions indicate that regardless of the type of return, the aggregate effect of previous outcomes on risk attitude is significantly negative even if the previous variance is included, which supports our theory of dynamic loss-aversion. Even though, we find a minor increase in the significance by changing the reference point from the average return to the return relative to the price of the last buy transaction first, then to the return relative to the historical expected return second, the extremely low adjusted R-squared values indicate nonlinear dynamics or missing variables. Regression five yields a possible reason for this latter finding: gains and losses have a distinct effect on risk attitude, although, separating the previous outcomes by their sign does add a lot to the goodness-of-fit of the latter models.
This problem is well handled by changing the risk measure to volatility: regression six shows that the adjusted R-squared value jumps, which supports our discussion on the linear relationship between standard deviation and expected return in Section 2.2.
Results of the volatility estimation of regression seven indicate four main findings: first, the aggregate effect of previous outcomes is significantly negative again; second, equity has negative effect on risk-appetite indicating that investors holding larger amounts in capital assets invest into less risky portfolios; third, market participants with cash and retirement (IRA) accounts also avoid risk shown by their negative coefficient; fourth, margin account holders have higher appetite for risk as shown by the positive relationship between subsequent volatility and the margin dummy.
Altogether, regressions in Panel C all indicate a similar pattern as before: negative differences relative to the expected return have a significant and negative effect on the subsequent riskappetite, whereas positive differences are either much less significant or not significant at all. In particular, regressions nine and ten show that choices of high-income investors are just as sensitive to previous outcomes as low-income investors.
In Panel D regression results show a somewhat mixed picture: although coefficients are not significant everywhere, the previous patterns apply to every subgroup except for the coefficient of the positive previous return of margin account holders. In this latter group, both previous gains and losses are significantly negative leading to lower and higher subsequent volatility respectively.
Altogether, we find similar results to the aggregated regression of Eq. (30) and its adjustment for separated gains and losses. Although, for positive deviations from the expected return we find a statistically significant positive effect on subsequent volatility, we argue that the low p-values are due to the extremely high number of observations. Following Lin et al. (2011) we provide here a test for the economic significance and analyze the effect of increasing number of observations on the significance of the coefficients of the previous outcome. According to our theoretical explanation, positive deviations from the expected return are also negatively correlated with subsequent volatility; nevertheless, since volatility is non-negative, huge realized gains lead to exactly the same portfolio choice (i.e. the risk-free asset) as a gain that is just high enough to cover two subsequent periods of the required return. Therefore, positive returns higher than a relatively small level (at least twice of the expected return) cannot be described by a linear relationship with volatility but are driven by a random process. This leads to the fact that for a reasonable number of observations, where the case of "too big to fail" does not apply, p-values of the positive coefficient should not indicate a significant effect. The last three regressions in Panel C (regressions eight to ten), in which the p-value of the coefficient of previous gains is much higher than that of losses, suggest such relationship; however, for such high number of observations a tiny effect may prove to be significant.
Hence, in Figure 2 we present the coefficient p-values as a function of the number of observations, in which regression eight is estimated with the following methodology: first, we draw 100 random sub-samples for each sample size going from 100 to 10000; second, for each of these 100 random sub-samples regression eight is estimated; third, the p-value of the 100 the coefficients obtain for each sample size is defined. We plot these p-values as a function of the sample size, where the continuous, dashed and dotted lines stand for the p-values of gains, losses and the 0.05 level respectively. One can clearly see that the coefficient of losses is always significant for sample sizes at least as high as 2500, whereas for gains p-values are above 0.05 even for sample sizes around 10,000. We argue that this finding supports our explanation of the economically insignificant effect of previous gains. Another way to handle the non-linearity problem of previous gains would be to use a simple dummy variable for positive shocks. The intuition behind this idea is that if the expected return is relatively very small compared to the positive shocks, then, shocks exceeding this expected return have a constant effect on volatility, since investors would not and cannot reduce their required return and portfolio volatility to values below zero: they hold assets providing at least the risk-free return with zero volatility. Therefore, there is a discontinuity in the model for gains, which can be handled with the use of a dummy variable.
In the followings, we compare the results of the aforementioned model applying a dummy variable for gains and the model assuming a linear relationship between previous gains and subsequent volatility. Table 3 represents our findings. The dependent variable is listed in the columns, the Coef columns represent the estimated coefficients for the independent variables listed in the rows, whereas the p-value columns stand for the probability of an incorrect rejection of the zero null hypothesis.
The results indicate three important findings: first, by avoiding the discontinuity problem the regression model support our idea of a positive relationship between previous gains and volatility instead of linearity; second, this relationship becomes much more significant than in the linear model and therefore, all the variables have extremely low p-values; third, the adjusted Rsquared also increases in the new model suggesting a better fit with the dummy variable.
Hence, altogether the findings support the negative relationship proposed in our theoretical model.
In conclusion, we argue that the results presented in this subsection confirm the empirical validity of the behavioral side of our explanation. The aggregate coefficient of previous outcomes is negative and significant everywhere, even in regressions where other control variables are included. In particular, it seems irrelevant whether we test the effect on low-or high-income investors; the pattern emerges for all of them. Therefore, as a confirmation of the theoretical model described in Section 2, we find that previous outcomes indeed affect asset allocation and, subsequent to losses and gains, yield a money inflow into assets with higher and lower risk respectively. This finding is confirmed in existing literature on mutual fund activity as well, in which a negative relationship was found between returns and subsequent money inflows (Warther, 1995; Goetzman and Massa, 1999; Edelen and Warner, 1999) and between contemporaneous inflow of equity and bond funds (Goetzmann et al., 2000) . Therefore, we argue that our model can capture and explain the unexpected changes in the demand for capital assets.
Estimating a volatility model
Based on the findings presented above, the empirical estimation of the theoretical volatility model is presented in the followings. The α and β parameters in Eq. (31) 
where ∈ [−1,0] and ∈ [0,1]. Here, the error term is not homoscedastic, therefore, we define the standardized error ut as
First the distribution of the error is estimated based on maximum likelihood. As Jarque-Bera tests clearly reject the null hypothesis of normality, the standardized is assumed to follow a scaled Student's-t distribution with ( ) = 0. Therefore, the estimated parameters consist of the scaling s and degress of freedom df. Due to non-linear likelihood optimization, the fitted distribution is particularly sensitive to the starting values of the degrees of freedom. Hence, we provide ten estimations for each α and β pair, in which the ten starting values of the degrees of freedom are numbers equally placed in a logarithmic scale between one and the number of observations. For example, our monthly analysis includes 1061 monthly returns; therefore, the applied starting values for the degrees of freedom are 1, 2, 5, 10, 22, 48, 104, 226, 489 and 1061. The starting value of the scaling parameter is always set to one. Out of the ten estimations, the one with the highest Kolmogorov-Smirnoff p-value (the best fit) is chosen.
Second, we apply a Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test for each α and β pair to measure the significance of the difference between the empirical and estimated distribution functions. These pairs include 10201 sets consisting of the crossproducts of 101 equally placed α values between -1 and zero, and 101 equally placed β values between zero and 1. The higher the p-value, the better the fit; therefore, the pair yielding the highest p-value indicates the best fit of a distribution conditional to ( ) = 0. In other words, this latter pair is considered to provide the least significant error terms.
The numerical simulation for weekly data yields = −0.03 0.21 . Here, the fitted distribution has a scaling s=1.16 and a degree of freedom of df=6. The probability that we incorrectly reject the null hypothesis of the Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test is 0.8535. In Figure 3 , we show the p-value (the goodness of fit) of the Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test as a function of α and β. Both results confirm our aforementioned reasoning for the negative effect of previous shocks on subsequent volatility; moreover, the positive relationship between risk and required return remains intact. The particularly high p-values indicate that the error terms are well fitted using scaled Student's-t distributions.
It is worth mentioning that the model presented above describes the dynamics of the volatility of the whole market. However, as presented in Appendix 1, asymmetric volatility affects individual assets as well. We argue that this phenomenon stands on the fact that market and asset returns are highly correlated, especially in periods of greater continuous shocks (e.g. the financial crisis)
that affect volatility significantly. This latter correlation can be attributed to our aforementioned market microstructural reasoning: if heuristic-driven traders are present, demand for both the market portfolio and, thus, all of the risky assets increases (decreases) subsequent to negative (positive) market shocks. Moreover, the heuristic-driven demand affects positively the spread and the volatility
We present a brief correlation test between the volatilities of the index and individual assets in Table 4 . The results are consistent with the proposed reasoning for the asymmetry in case of individual assets. Notes: The table represents cross-correlation statistics between individual asset volatilities and market volatility in the same period. The columns represent the results of the weekly and monthly sampled daily volatility. The rows stand for the number of positive correlations, those which are significantly positive at 0.05 level, the number of negative correlations and those which are significantly negative at 0.05 level. The 500 pairs represent the correlations between the 500 members of the S&P500 index and the index itself.
According to weekly analysis, volatility correlation with the index is positive for all the 500 individual assets, although in three cases it is not significant. Nonetheless, these three latter assets (in particular, the equities with tickers "MNST", "NAVI" and "NWSA") have only become recently listed in the stock exchange, and therefore, correlation is tested on a much shorter interval than in the other cases. Hence, in these three cases the significance test yields low pvalues due to the insufficient number of observations.
Applying monthly periods a similar pattern arises. Out of the 8 insignificant correlation coefficients 6 can be attributed to short available time series here as well. Altogether the positive correlation between individual assets is a robust pattern both in our weekly and monthly analysis, and hence, it is indeed a reasonable cause for the asymmetric volatility of individual assets.
Concluding remarks
We find that asymmetric and autoregressive volatility measured in previous empirical studies in asset pricing can be derived from and attributed to intertemporal choice of investors, assuming that they behave according to prospect theory in a dynamic setting. We show that, in contrast to most of the studies on this topic, individuals tend to become less risk-averse (or risk-seeking until a given point) and more risk-averse subsequent to losses and gains respectively, which leads to the rejection of the volatility feedback and BHS explanations for asymmetric volatility.
Furthermore, we argue that the third existing explanation (the leverage effect) does not hold either, as the analysis provided yields a significant, volatility decreasing effect of both previous gains and losses of a given asset when controlling for the market return.
However, our proposed model is based on a negative relationship between market returns and market volatility, and is thus able to capture the dynamics of volatility measured empirically.
Combining the linear relationship between risk and return, as presented above in detail, and the aforementioned pattern in the intertemporal choice (i.e. the required return) yields the autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity model presented in this paper. We show that the discrete and continuous time alternatives of the main equation result in the TGARCH and EGARCH models respectively, which, in particular, are measured to be two of the regressions with the highest goodness-of-fit in most of the empirical studies. Moreover, an empirical parameter estimation in discrete time indicates that the proposed model indeed outperforms the simple random walk model, and the negative effect of previous outcomes is significant.
Potential ways of further research include various opportunities. First, an experimental analysis would be interesting to show whether these patterns are found in a laboratory environment as well if the focus is on the effect of breaking-even. Second, the influence of this behavior on asset liquidity and market microstructure could be analyzed in detail including an empirical analysis of the probability estimation of heuristic-driven traders. Third, the application of the proposed model in mathematical finance could reveal further interesting patterns; in particular, asymmetric stochastic volatility models (Heston and Nandi, 2000) in option pricing are found to provide better estimates on option prices and fit the "volatility smile" of the Black-Scholes implied volatilities, which regressions could be further improved by including the proposed model described in this paper. Finally, the introduction of cognitive research, such as the neuroeconomic approach, could reveal further underlying factors behind the behavioral patterns presented in this paper.
variable that takes the value of the return if it is non-negative and zero otherwise. The estimation yields the form
In order to test the discontinuity around zero return (in the ±0.05 quantile environment of the empirical distribution), a dummy for positive values, is tested as well; hence
The existence of volatility feedback effect could be analyzed at this point by testing whether the coefficients of both previous gains and losses are significantly higher than zero. However, the interpretation of the leverage effect still might be misleading due to omitted factors. The latter explanation states that volatility is negatively correlated with previous asset returns; nonetheless, Eq. (A3) may include the contribution of other factors such as the market return as well. Hence, the following estimation reveals the clean, decomposed effect of the previous market and asset returns on volatility: 
Empirical results Table A1 summarizes the OLS estimation results of models from Eq. (A1) to (A6) (as indicated by numbers in the first row) using weekly statistics. We argue that the effects are driven by two distinct factors. On the one hand, the previous market return has indeed a negative correlation with the volatility of an asset. As we show below, this is due to the aggregate perception of utility caused by the loss-averse behavior in a dynamic setting. In other words, investors turn to riskier assets providing higher expected return in order to be able to break even and compensate for previous losses. On the other hand, the volatility-decreasing effect of previous shocks of a given asset is simply caused by the base effect: in case of massive shocks in the asset price the contemporaneous volatility rises and, since volatility follows a strong mean-reverting process, the unusually high or low level of volatility is followed by a decrease or increase respectively. This latter proposition is supported by the results that the lag-1 autocorrelation of the volatility difference of each asset is negative and is significant at 5% in our sample: a rise in volatility is likely to be followed by a decrease.
In order to increase the robustness of these results a monthly test is also provided in Table A2, where we focus on regressions Eq. (A1) and (A6) omitting the transitory steps. The results are in line with the weekly analysis, and therefore, the pattern is robust regardless of the length of the period applied. One may argue that these results are subject to selection bias (i.e. some members existent at the end of the examination period have no trading data at the beginning): fluctuations towards the end of the period are over weighted. Therefore, another robustness test is presented in the first column of Table A3 including These results confirm that market return is negatively correlated with the subsequent change in volatility, whereas the effect of the asset return either remain the same or becomes minor in magnitude relative to that of the market return.
